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Abstract
This article uses McAlevey’s mobilising/organising dichotomy to analyse the 
recent McDonald’s mobilisation in Britain. It argues that this movement has had 
some impressive successes but building on these requires greater organising 
activities. However, conventional union organising techniques are unlikely to 
be successful in hospitality. Instead, the approach of another low-wage worker 
movement OUR Walmart demonstrates how social media can be used not only 
to benefit mobilising activities but to enable organising beyond the workplace.
Keywords
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Introduction
In September 2017, McDonald’s faced its first ever strike action in Britain. The #McStrike 
came to fruition following votes in favour of the Bakers, Food and Allied Workers 
Union’s (BFAWU) call for industrial action at two McDonald’s restaurants. The move-
ment which developed out of this strike resembles, and is inspired by, the Service 
Employees International Union’s (SEIU) Fight for $15 in the United States (Cant 2018; 
Cant & Woodcock 2019). However, Fight for $15 proved extremely resource intensive 
and has been heavily criticised for ignoring worker organising (Dencik & Wilkin 2015; 
McAlevey 2015, 2016). In light of these issues, how should we understand Britain’s 
#McStrike? This article seeks to answer this question by reflecting on the author’s partici-
pant observation of three fast food worker protests (two in Britain and one in the United 
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States) and 6 weeks of participant observation of organising by Walmart workers in 
California. It combines these ethnographic reflections with an indicative media analysis 
of #McStrike in order to argue that if this movement is to build on its mobilising success, 
it must learn from another US labour campaign, ‘OUR Walmart’ (Wood 2015). This 
tale of two union campaigns highlights how, unlike Fight for $15, OUR Walmart used 
social media not only to enhance mobilising activity but also for organising. In particu-
lar, social media provided a crucial means for worker organising beyond the workplace 
and which could help overcome employer hostility and worker fragmentation. To fully 
understand #McStrike and analyse its potential requires that we first understand the Fight 
for $15 movement in the United States which directly inspired it.
The Fight for $15
On 30 November 2012, around 200 New York City fast food workers from McDonald’s 
and Burger King went on strike demanding US$15 per hour, a raise of around US$7, 
and the right to form a union (Dencik & Wilkin 2015; Pasquier & Wood 2018). The 
success of this mobilisation can be seen in the role it played in the adoption of a higher 
US$15 per hour minimum wage in Seattle, California and New York (Pasquier & Wood 
2018). The campaign began earlier that year when SEIU, the second-largest US union 
with around two million members, formed an alliance with the community organisa-
tion, New York Communities for Change (NYCC). With the SEIU’s backing, NYCC 
proceeded to make contact with fast food workers and their communities. In alliance 
with other community and faith groups, NYCC and SEIU created ‘Fast Food Forward’ 
as the New York City chapter of what would soon become a wider national movement. 
These other local chapters took action in major cities during the first half of 2013, build-
ing up to a coordinated day of action across 60 cities on 29 August 2013, and a similar 
day of action on 5 December 2013 (Dencik & Wilkin 2015). This last action included 
a coordinated strike across 100 cities and culminated in a large evening rally in New York 
City (observed by the author) which drew together hundreds of supporters from the 
labour movement, community and faith organisations and dozens of workers. Since 
2013, numerous larger national one-day strikes have followed (Dencik & Wilkin 2015), 
including a demonstration by more than 500 fast food workers and 1500 supporters at 
McDonald’s headquarters in May 2014, which led to the arrest of 101 McDonald’s 
workers and 38 community supporters (Rushe 2014).
This mobilisation gained significant traditional media coverage from leading US out-
lets such as The New York Times and The Washington Post (Dencik & Wilkin 2015). 
Moreover, Pasquier and Wood (2018) argued social media amplified these offline actions 
and facilitated the building of online coalitions with movements such as Occupy Wall 
Street and Black Lives Matter. As a consequence, Fight for $15 has more than 300,000 
Facebook likes and more than 50,000 Twitter followers. Social media requires each indi-
vidual to participate in the broadcasting of the message. Castells (2012) refers to this as 
‘mass self-communication’ – making social media well suited to highlighting highly per-
sonalised individual worker testimonies. Therefore, the heavy use of social media by 
Fight for $15 coupled with professional community organisers, while keeping the union 
offstage, significantly increased the legitimacy of the mobilisation in the eyes of the 
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public, media and policymakers (Pasquier & Wood 2018). Despite its central role, SIEU 
was able to remain in the background, meaning that the protests appeared far more 
grassroots and worker-led than they were in reality (Dencik & Wilkin 2015).
The SEIU and its discontents
The Fight for $15 campaign has been undeniably successful at raising the issue of low 
wages in the hospitality industry, building support for higher minimum wages and rais-
ing awareness of unions among young workers (Pasquier & Wood 2018). However, these 
successes have come at a heavy financial price. In 2014 alone, SEIU spent US$24 million 
on the campaign (Layne & Baertlein 2015). This is clearly a very large sum to spend on 
activities not resulting in union recognition at a single workplace. That it was necessary 
for SEIU to spend so much also raises questions as to how genuinely grassroots and 
worker-led the campaign really was. Unsurprisingly, the campaign is not without its crit-
ics – including McAlevey (2015) who argued: ‘The problem is that there isn’t any depth 
to the Fight for $15 campaign. We call it the Berlin Rosen [a PR company] campaign: 
one hot-shot media firm that’s gotten something like US$50 to US$70 million from 
SEIU to paint, through social media, the illusion of a huge movement’. This critique 
builds upon McAlevey’s wider disillusionment with the strategy pursued by the SEIU 
leadership since the mid-1990s. She illustrates her criticism by drawing a distinction 
between ‘shallow mobilising’ and ‘deep organising’ (McAlevey 2016). Shallow mobilis-
ing entails professional staff attempting to motivate large numbers of people to engage in 
a campaign. However, those who join the campaign are often the same activists who can 
always be counted on to turn up at every protest and meeting, but who are incapable of 
building support among their wider colleagues or communities. What matters in this 
mobilising model is simply having sufficient numbers ‘for a photo good enough to tweet 
or maybe generate earned media’ (McAlevey 2016: 10) and thus disempowers workers 
because it relies on professional organisers who make the key decisions, with little grass-
roots accountability. Thus workers, such as those engaged in Fight for $15, are confined 
to play only a symbolic role as ‘authentic messengers’ managed by PR professionals. She 
contends that mobilising in this way can only ever win low-cost victories as it constitutes 
little more than ‘pretend power’ (McAlevey 2016).
In contrast, she outlined how organising activities focus on expanding the number 
of people involved in a campaign who were not previously engaged, and who would 
not normally consider themselves to be activists. This model is derived from the 
activities of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in the 1930s and focuses 
upon building mass collective organisations through identifying and growing the 
skills of organic leaders. Organic leaders are the key influencers in a workplace – these 
people are able to draw on their social networks in the workplace and community to 
expand participation until mass action, such as majority strikes, becomes possible, 
drawing on a high level of support from the workers’ own community in a manner 
which is impossible for professional external organisers to replicate. Similar criticisms 
of Fight for $15 have been made by Dencik and Wilkin (2015: 149, 160), who sug-
gested it was little more than a tightly controlled PR ‘march on the media’ and that 
‘if practices of social media become . . . increasingly important . . . but are primarily 
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concerned with visibility and advocacy, this tends to favour fast and short-term 
actions of spectacle and risks neglecting the solid relationships that are necessary to 
sustain any campaign or organising drive over time’. McAlevey (2014, 2016) pro-
vided a number of convincing case studies in healthcare, education and food manu-
facturing of the benefits of the organising model. She has little doubt that mobilising 
campaigns such as Fight for $15 build ‘little real power . . . it is not a life altering 
change, and the process develops few real worker leaders’ (McAlevey 2016: 65). In 
light of these criticisms of Fight for $15 and SEIU’s ‘mobilising model’, how should 
Britain’s #McStrike be understood?
#McStrike
Press reports suggest around 40 workers in Cambridge and London took part in the first 
#McStrike (Khomami 2017). This first strike was organised in response to dissatisfaction 
with the McDonald’s grievance procedure (Press Association 2017) and, in particular, 
the prevalence of ‘flexible discipline’ (Wood 2018). Flexible discipline enabled managers 
to informally punish workers simply by arbitrarily cutting the workers’ scheduled hours 
(Kollewe & Slawson 2017). The schedule insecurity entailed by flexible discipline is a 
considerable source of distress and suffering for workers (Wood & Burchell 2018). The 
resultant strike action sparked by flexible discipline led to significant nationwide demon-
strations with more than 100 supporters protesting outside McDonald’s headquarters in 
London on the preceding Saturday (Kollewe & Slawson 2017). Despite the mobilisation 
having been generated out of workplace discontent regarding managerial discipline, the 
campaign quickly adopted a more conventional headline demand of ‘£10 per hour and 
a union’. On the day of the strike, approximately 200 supporters, including the Shadow 
Chancellor, John McDonnell, held a rally outside Parliament (Khomami 2017). 
Moreover, with the support of the left-wing campaign group, Momentum, dozens of 
protests were held across Britain. For example, in Oxford, I observed how the local 
Momentum group joined with the Oxford Living Wage Campaign to organise a rally 
and leafleting outside the city centre’s McDonald’s restaurant. However, worker partici-
pation in these activities proved minimal. The campaign was, however, extremely suc-
cessful at gaining both traditional and social media traction. For example, just 40 workers 
out of a workforce of 115,000 went on strike for a single shift but managed to generate 
more than 5,000 words of coverage across seven articles in Britain’s main liberal newspa-
per, The Guardian, over a 3-week period between 18 August and 8 September 2017. The 
strike also went viral on social media. For instance, a video produced by Momentum, 
entitled ‘Breaking the Silence’, was watched more than two million times across Facebook 
and Twitter. On Twitter alone, more than 6,000 people retweeted or commented on the 
video and the video was viewed by more than 25,000 Facebook users who list McDonald’s 
as their employer (Elgot 2017). What was remarkable about the impact of this strike was 
that unlike SEIU in the United States, the BFAWU is a relatively small union, with 
18,000 members and an income of just £3 million.
Following this initial strike, in January, McDonald’s increased pay at its directly run 
restaurants and recommended that its franchises did the same (Chapman 2018). A more 
limited strike and demonstration followed on May Day 2018, before a large-scale day of 
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action on 4 October 2018 which linked together McDonald’s workers with other hospi-
tality workers at Weatherspoons, TGI Fridays and Uber (see also Cant & Woodcock 
2019). Again, the action focused on a strike by a limited number of workers in combina-
tion with a large demonstration outside a central London McDonald’s outlet, in addition 
to dozens of other local protests. Once more this garnered significant traditional and 
social media attention. For example, during a 3-week period between 20 September and 
4 October 2018, The Guardian covered the strike with over 2,000 words across four 
articles, plus a video posted on its website. To understand these events requires first 
examining the fast food workers movement in the United States which directly inspired 
them (Cant 2018; Cant & Woodcock 2019).
Analysing #McStrike
The case studies used by McAlevey (2014, 2016) to construct her argument clearly dem-
onstrate the power unions can build when they focus on organising over mobilising in 
public services such as healthcare and education. It is important, however, to draw a 
distinction between the power resources available to core public service workers and 
those available to workers in hospitality. Workers who provide health and education have 
the potential for creating significant disruption by withdrawing their labour. A strike in 
healthcare, for example, would have immediate and serious implications for patients, 
meaning that employers must take the strike seriously and invest heavily in keeping ser-
vices running. While the impacts in education are not as immediately serious, strikes, 
nevertheless, have significant wider economic consequences by requiring workers to stay 
at home to care for their children (Silver 2003). The main barrier to disruptive strike 
action by public service workers is their feelings of responsibility towards the public – a 
fact that employers and the media are all too ready to exploit so as to weaken worker 
resolve (Miliband 1973). On the other hand, these services are usually aggregated 
together and provided on mass, meaning that these workplaces are relatively large, and 
that organic leaders can tap into extensive social networks to grow engagement. As 
pointed out by McAlevey (2016), many of these workers also have customer-facing roles, 
which aid the building of community alliances. These workers therefore have potentially 
high levels of both ‘structural economic bargaining power’ and ‘associational power’ 
(Silver 2003; Wright 2000). For these reasons, healthcare and education tend to be heav-
ily unionised in Europe. Even in Britain, union density is more than 50% in education 
and more than 40% in health and social work, with similar proportions covered by col-
lective agreements (BIS 2015).
In contrast, hospitality services are provided to consumers on an individual basis and, 
thus, tend to be relatively small scale and geographically dispersed so that workplace and 
community social networks are also smaller. These workers additionally lack structural 
economic power, not holding a strategic location in the social division of labour, or 
scarce skills which are hard to replace and these workers tend to be drawn from loose 
labour markets. As Silver (2003) pointed out,
in the fast food industry . . . a strike in just one or a few outlets within a large chain will not 
interfere with the operation of other outlets in the same chain . . . [Moreover] people will not 
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starve . . . [as] there are multiple competing alternatives . . . the level of coordination among 
workers necessary to bring about a general stoppage . . . is very hard to attain. (p. 120)
Given the weak structural economic power of fast food workers, it is hard to imagine 
how the ‘organising model’ could ever achieve the kind of economically disruptive 
majority strikes which are held to be the aim of this approach. Presumably, McAlevey 
would argue that unions should not waste their time and resources on workers such as 
these, and instead focus on ‘education and healthcare [which] are the strategic sectors’ 
(McAlevey 2016: 203). Certainly, the amounts spent on Fight for $15 does raise the 
question of value for money, but Britain’s current McStrike mobilisation has seemingly 
been much less resource intensive, has won some concessions from the employer while 
highlighting the issues of low pay and inequality and raising awareness of unions.
Rather than abandoning low-paid hospitality workers, it is necessary to recognise that 
lacking both structural economic power and associational power, they require access to a 
different power source if they are to achieve any improvements in their conditions. Chun 
(2009) demonstrated the importance of symbolic power in manipulating socially 
accepted concepts and norms in order to legitimise worker struggles. Moreover, Wright 
and Brown (2013) suggested employers’ increasing sensitivity about their public reputa-
tions may present an alternative ‘opportunity structure’ to traditional collective bargain-
ing. Mobilising activities might actually be well suited to this alternative opportunity 
structure, offering such workers their only means for improving conditions. Therefore, 
while acknowledging the tremendous importance of organising, there is a danger of 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater if we consequently abandon mobilising. As 
can be seen in McAlevey’s (2016: 207) research, mobilising techniques are an important 
source of worker power but as she correctly argues the problem is that these tactics have 
been converted into a ‘model’ which denies the importance of organising. There is, how-
ever, another US low-wage workers’ movement, in retail rather than hospitality, that 
demonstrates how such workers can effectively undertake organising while simultane-
ously using mobilising activities to improve their conditions. In 2013, I spent 6 weeks 
participating in this mobilisation (see: Wood 2015).
Towards networked organising: OUR Walmart
In 2013, the retailer, Walmart, was the world’s largest private sector employer and had 
already defeated numerous unionisation attempts (Lichtenstein 2009). As a result, the 
United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) created the ‘The Organisation 
United for Respect at Walmart’ (OUR Walmart). The impact of this mobilisation can be 
seen in the fact that Walmart increased starting pay to US$10 per hour, improving the 
pay of more than 500,000 workers. This victory was impressive, given Walmart’s histori-
cal hostility towards unions and that starting pay had previously stagnated around the 
minimum wage (Wood 2015). The potential for traditional union organising at Walmart 
was minimal, as union organisers were routinely expelled from stores and workers feared 
retaliation even for mentioning unions. This context made it difficult for even the most 
effective organic leaders to emerge and engage more than a handful of workers. McAlevey 
(2016: 62) is often dismissive of social media, for example, suggesting that those who 
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took part in Occupy believed that ‘tweeting about it will generate enough power to bring 
down Wall Street’. However, it is a mistake to see social media only as a mobilising tool 
when, in fact, it can also facilitate organising.
Social media provided Walmart workers with a means to connect with each other and 
union organisers beyond the boundaries of their workplaces. As a result, the 1,000 
Californian members of OUR Walmart were dispersed across numerous different stores. 
It was Facebook groups which provided them with space in which to learn of their simi-
larities and develop a sense of solidarity. Social media provided a means for organic lead-
ers to access social networks when traditional workplace social networks were barred to 
them due to employer repression. These social media–facilitated networks were used to 
bring other workers and members of the community into the mobilisation. Social 
media–facilitated networks are well suited for this purpose as they do not have rigid com-
municative boundaries and are, thus, organisationally de-centred (Castells 2012). This 
enables an expansive form of solidarity to develop in which workers can easily learn 
about mobilisation efforts and begin communicating with their colleagues simply as a 
result of viewing a post on social media or joining an online group. For example, workers 
explained how viewing videos on Facebook and YouTube of leaders and actions from 
other stores was an important factor leading to their own participation.
While professional organisers played a key role in framing work issues as injustices and 
while it was clear that the UFCW’s professional organisers played an important role in 
engaging workers, I witnessed how, in California at least, this process was also the outcome 
of organic and independent communication between workers. It was interaction between 
workers facilitated by social media that was most influential for the realisation of common 
work experiences. In fact, the shared identity which developed out of this process coalesced 
into a class-based notion of exploited low-wage workers (Wood 2015). Again, this is a 
strength of social media that it enables ‘expansive networking’ in which broad sets of con-
nections form (Castells 2012). I also observed how the union played a vital role in guiding 
decision-making but at the same time emphasised worker engagement and empowerment. 
For example, in meetings, union organisers acted as facilitators, who encouraged workers 
to participate and as a result it was clear that workers found the experience empowering and 
felt ownership of the mobilisation. I observed how the meetings contrasted with the pro-
cess-heavy format synonyms with conventional union meetings.
The use of social media to aid organising thus enabled OUR Walmart to overcome 
barriers to workplace organising through adopting a more network-like form in which 
the union played the role of ‘orchestrator’ by providing strategic oversight (Arquilla & 
Ronfeldt 2000; Heckscher & McCarthy 2014). Despite the role of the union and the 
fact that it was spending millions of dollars supporting the mobilisation, OUR Walmart 
did not seek to engage in formal collective bargaining or to gain union recognition. In 
fact, it was widely recognised that Walmart would never accept a union. Walmart had 
reached market saturation in its traditional markets, and same-store sales had been 
declining in recent years. The fact that its expansion into metropolitan markets could be 
delayed or blocked by concerned local authorities (as happened in New York City) pre-
sented OUR Walmart with an opportunity structure by which it could apply pressure to 
Walmart. OUR Walmart, therefore, should not be judged in terms of its structural eco-
nomic power – that is, the potential to organise disruptive strikes – but rather by the 
8 Capital & Class 00(0)
potential for its direct actions to damage the reputation of Walmart to such an extent 
that Democrat politicians would block its growth. Mobilising tactics were well suited to 
this task, and OUR Walmart’s networked form was crucial for facilitating reputational 
damage. High levels of communication can enable networks, guided by orchestrators, to 
undertake ‘swarming’ collective action – the strategic pulsing of action from all direc-
tions which is particularly effective at causing reputational damage (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 
2000; Heckscher & Carré 2006). This swarming meant that a relatively small number of 
workers stopping work for a single shift created a significant level of media coverage of 
working conditions at Walmart. This was because social media aggregated the actions 
undertaken by small workplace groups of around five workers – and sometimes even 
lone individuals – into a continual stream of connected actions dramatically playing out 
across the country (Wood 2015).
Conclusion
McAlevey (2014, 2016) provides a powerful and convincing account of the need for 
unions to engage in organising activities. In strategic sectors where there is potential for 
workers to leverage both structural economic and associational power, these organising 
activities can facilitate powerful majority strikes. However, it would be an error to assume 
that this same approach would be successful in hospitality industries, such as fast food. 
In this sector, workers lack structural economic power and there are significant barriers 
to conventional associational power. Reputational damage offers such workers an alter-
native opportunity structure to traditional collective bargaining. Mobilising activities are 
well suited to this approach especially when used in combination with social media. That 
said, McAlevey (2015, 2016) is right to highlight how focusing only on mobilising at the 
expense of organising is a shortcut to nowhere, given that it does not build worker power 
and, in fact, disempowers those workers it does engage. In fact, this is precisely what has 
been reported as taking place in the workplaces involved in the #McStrike (Canady 
2019). As Wright et al. (2019) argued, there is a danger that unions focus ‘exclusively on 
the more immediate benefits which social media presents for mobilising. Consequently, 
social media could have the contradictory effect of further reducing union membership, 
by pulling attention and resources away from organising, even as spectacles of worker 
collective action seemingly increase’ (p. 20). Given the limited resource of BFAWU, it is 
understandable why it has focused on the immediate gains which social media–facili-
tated mobilising activities can bring, but to build on the successes which #McStrike has 
already achieved and take the campaign to the next level requires greater organising activ-
ity (see also Cant 2018; Cant & Woodcock 2019). OUR Walmart demonstrates that 
social media can facilitate effective organising in addition to supporting mobilising. 
However, such activities are resource intensive. The challenge is to find innovative means 
of funding these organising activities; one potential source is crowdfunding, while in the 
United States charitable trusts have played an important role in funding worker centres. 
Another option could be for the Trade Union Congress and larger unions along with 
charitable trusts to set up a ‘Union Renewal R&D Fund’ which smaller unions and 
organisations could apply to for resources on the condition that their activities are inde-
pendently evaluated to provide lessons for the renewal of the wider labour movement.
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